The successful hosting of the G20 Summit in Johannesburg from Nov 22 to 23 marked a symbolic milestone, not only underscoring the rise of the Global South but also acting as a powerful catalyst for a new phase in China-Africa relations. By placing Africa's priorities at the center of the global agenda, the summit created a historic opportunity to convert political will into lasting institutional influence. The key challenge ahead is to jointly design rules and structures in global governance.

The Johannesburg Summit demonstrated the potential of China-Africa collaboration in global economic governance. South Africa, as chair, worked closely with China to elevate African priorities — such as industrialization, debt sustainability and a just energy transition — to core G20 discussion topics. Yet, this summit-based coordination must evolve into a more resilient and institutionalized agenda-setting bloc to ensure lasting impact. The primary challenge is that current coordination relies heavily on high-level political consensus and mutual support at critical moments, lacking a permanent, technocratic foundation. The forward path necessitates the establishment of an informal but regular "China-Africa Caucus" within the G20 framework. This core group, comprising sherpas, finance ministers and central bank delegations, should convene routinely before major G20 meetings to harmonize positions and technical proposals on key issues. This mechanism would transform reactive support into proactive, co-designed agenda-setting.

Several key areas offer immediate potential for such coordinated action.

First, on global financial architecture reform, the shared goal of increasing the voting shares and voice of developing countries in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank requires a unified strategy. The proposed caucus could put forward concrete quota-reform plans and timelines, leveraging China's position within the IMF to amplify Africa's collective demands and building a broader coalition with other Global South nations.

Second, regarding debt and sustainable financing, cooperation under the G20 Common Framework should be deepened. Such a caucus could advocate making the framework more efficient, transparent and equitable for all creditors, including China. It could also promote innovative debt restructuring tools, such as "debt-for-climate/nature" swaps, and work to get these novel solutions onto the formal agenda of G20 Finance Ministers' Meetings.

Third, on climate finance and the just energy transition, Africa's vast renewable potential is hampered by a massive financing gap. Within the G20, China and Africa can jointly push for more operational climate-funding mechanisms, building on the success of bundling climate finance with trade facilitation initiatives. A key objective would be to collectively hold the G20 developed members accountable for delivering on the long-standing $100 billion annual climate finance pledge, ensuring funds are directed to Africa's most critical needs. To ensure this coordination is effective, it must shift from being opportunity-driven to goal-oriented. This requires establishing a set of measurable key performance indicators, such as tracking the number of China-Africa initiatives adopted in the G20 communiqués, monitoring annual increases in African voting shares in the Bretton Woods institutions, and quantifying climate and development funds flowing to Africa via G20 channels.

The elevation of China-Africa relations to an "all-weather community with a shared future for the new era" at the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit demands that cooperation transcend traditional economic domains and demonstrate solidarity across the broader spectrum of global governance. The Beijing Action Plan (2025-27), with its 10 Partnership Actions, provides the blueprint. However, its promises must be underpinned by robust implementation mechanisms, including a joint oversight working group between the FOCAC's followup committee and the African Union Commission to ensure accountability.

This "all-weather" partnership must also be manifested in unified stances across multilateral platforms. In global public health, building on the "Health Silk Road", both sides should co-advocate in the World Health Organization for equitable vaccine distribution and support technology transfer for local pharmaceutical production in Africa. On international peace and security, China's Global Security Initiative aligns with Africa's "Silencing the Guns" aspiration. China can support African-led solutions in the United Nations Security Council for hotspots such as the Sahel, advocating more non-conditioned peacekeeping funding.

In the critical arena of digital governance and artificial intelligence, as digital cooperation deepens, China and Africa must present a common front to prevent rule-setting from being dominated by a few developed nations. Based on shared views on data security and development needs, they can table joint proposals in the UN on AI ethics and cross-border data flows, ensuring the digital future reflects their interests.

The resilience of the China-Africa partnership ultimately hinges on the deep, strategic alignment between China's initiatives and Africa's master blueprint — the AU's Agenda 2063. This alignment must progress from being project-driven to being systemically integrated at the strategic level.

A "strategic alignment platform" involving China's National Development and Reform Commission and the AU Development Agency should be established. Its core task would be to meticulously map each of the 10 Partnership Actions onto the flagship projects and priority areas of the second 10-year implementation plan of the Agenda 2063. For instance, the Industry Chain Partnership Action should dovetail with the African Mining Vision and the Africa Accelerated Industrial Development Action Plan, focusing on developing local processing capabilities. The digital technology cooperation project should directly serve the goal of a single African digital market by collaborating on cross-border data infrastructure and standardized digital payment systems.

Achieving deep integration requires innovative financing beyond traditional government loans. Multilateral development banks such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank should play a larger role, creating dedicated financing windows for projects that meet the green development goals of Agenda 2063. Furthermore, China and Africa should pioneer new financial instruments, such as issuing thematic bonds in African markets linked to specific Agenda 2063 targets. Blended finance models, using platforms such as the China-Africa Development Fund to de-risk investments and attract more private capital for African industrial parks and tech startups, are crucial. In social sectors, outcome-based financing, where disbursements are tied to measurable results such as vaccination rates or youth employment, can enhance efficiency and impact, effectively countering narratives about unsustainable debt.

The Johannesburg Summit has opened an era of immense potential. The trajectory of the coming years will be determined by the China-Africa partnership's ability to pass three tests: institutionalizing coordination within the G20, acting in unison across the multilateral stage, and achieving strategic and financial fusion with Agenda 2063. This endeavor is more than an upgrade of infrastructure and trade cooperation; it is a profound transformation of global governance norms and practices. If successful, a united China-Africa partnership will not only accelerate the realization of Africa's aspirations but also offer the world a new paradigm of international relations based on mutual respect, equality and shared development, becoming a vital force for a more just, inclusive and sustainable global order.

The author is a professor at the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.