A profound geopolitical reconfiguration is quietly unfolding across Asia and the broader Global South. While Western commentary remains locked in the familiar vocabulary of rivalry, containment and zero-sum competition, an entirely different dynamic is emerging from within Asia itself — one defined not by confrontation, but by connectivity, common development and strategic diversification.

At the center of this shift is a triangular framework linking China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council. What began as modest cooperation is now evolving into South-South cooperation that is capable of contributing to global transformation and accelerating the transition toward a more multipolar world.

When leaders gathered in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in May this year for the ASEAN-China-GCC Summit, observers in Washington and Brussels largely dismissed it as symbolic diplomacy.

Yet the months that followed revealed how profoundly misread the moment was. Between June and November, governments began operationalizing the understandings reached at the summit, moving from exploratory dialogue to concrete initiatives.

This rapid progress was driven by two converging realities: first, the exposure of vulnerabilities in Western-dominated global logistics, particularly during the Red Sea disruptions; and second, the long-term rise of Asia's manufacturing systems, Gulf investment power and China's unmatched technological and industrial scale. As fragile supply chains faltered, ASEAN and GCC states recognized the urgency of diversifying routes and strengthening resilience.

The Red Sea crisis became a turning point for Southeast Asian as well as Gulf economies. Energy shipments slowed, manufacturing inputs were delayed and consumer prices became increasingly unpredictable.

Suddenly, an overdependence on a limited number of maritime choke points — shaped by decades of structures dominated by Western powers led by the United States — was viewed as a structural risk. In response, ASEAN and GCC leaders accelerated discussions on redundant trade corridors, alternative maritime routes and complementary land-sea infrastructure. Chinese engineering capacity and long-term financial tools, refined through the Belt and Road Initiative, provided the most practical path for implementing these ideas quickly. By broadening connectivity with China's support, ASEAN and the Gulf gain options, flexibility and insulation from external shocks.

China's role in this new configuration represents a model increasingly favored across the Global South: cooperation based on mutual respect, openness and nonconditionality.

After stabilizing its post-pandemic economy, China has expanded a wide range of regional initiatives — digital trade platforms, artificial intelligence-enabled logistics, smart-port systems, green-energy corridors and cross-border e-commerce networks. These systems create structural interdependence driven by development rather than confrontation. China's influence increases through scale, reliability and technological standards, while ASEAN and GCC economies benefit from integration into the world's most comprehensive industrial ecosystem. This engagement does not seek to build military blocs or ideological fronts, but to deepen mutually beneficial development.

The Gulf's eastward turn adds further significance to this triangular transformation. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have begun investing heavily in Southeast Asian renewable energy, critical minerals, electric vehicle supply chains, food-security corridors and advanced logistics infrastructure.

Unlike earlier waves of Gulf investment guided by short-term financial cycles, the current engagement is strategic and long-term. Gulf capitals recognize that the global economic center of gravity is shifting eastward and that sustainable diversification requires alignment with Asia's growth engines and China's strength in technology and industrial innovation. This turn does not imply abandoning Western partnerships; rather, it reflects a more balanced foreign policy in which the Gulf strengthens autonomy by expanding relations with all major global regions.

One of the most quietly transformative developments has been the growth of trilateral financial mechanisms. Since mid-2025, ASEAN and GCC central banks, together with Chinese regulators, have launched pilot programs for local-currency settlements in yuan-Malaysian ringgit and yuan-United Arab Emirates dirham pairings. These mechanisms are not intended to challenge the global currency system, but to reduce exposure to external financial volatility and strengthen economic autonomy and resilience. For China, they offer a practical path toward greater internalization of the renminbi through real trade usage. For ASEAN and the Gulf, they provide stability, predictability and independence in monetary affairs without provoking geopolitical confrontation.

Challenges remain, but they are manageable within the cooperative logic shaping this triangle. ASEAN continues to face internal divergences — including digital governance disparities, maritime security differences and varying attitudes toward major-power competition. These variations could, if unaddressed, limit its ability to fully realize the benefits of triangular cooperation. The GCC, meanwhile, must navigate the delicate balance between deepening ties with Asia and maintaining long-standing security partnerships with the US. China, for its part, must ensure that the expansion of its technological standards is accompanied by sensitivity to local needs and concerns, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and data governance.

Despite these complexities, by late 2025 cooperation among the three regions had expanded across trade corridors, financial systems, energy platforms, digital networks, green-transition projects and logistics hubs. What is emerging is a new model of South-South interdependence — functional, developmental and rooted in complementary strengths. ASEAN gains strategic diversification and renewed centrality; the GCC gains access to Asia's fastest-growing markets; and China consolidates its position as a major industrial and technological partner of the Global South. Together, they are quietly reshaping the global order through cooperation rather than confrontation.

As 2026 approaches, this emerging architecture could consolidate into a powerful Global South framework, fragment under the weight of national divergences, or evolve into a prototype for cross-regional governance integrating digital rules, infrastructure planning and financial systems. Whatever the outcome, the foundations have already shifted.

This is not an alliance and certainly not an ideological bloc. It is a new form of global cooperation in which China provides technological scale, the Gulf supplies capital and energy integration, and ASEAN contributes market dynamism and strategic centrality. If sustained, this triangular cooperation may emerge as an important model for Global South connectivity in the 21st century, reshaping how autonomy, development and resilience would be negotiated in an increasingly multipolar world.

The author is an assistant professor at International Islamic University Malaysia.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.