The China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership is moving toward a new phase

The rollout of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 in May 2025 marked the beginning of a two-decade-long pursuit of a resilient, innovative, dynamic and people-centered Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a continued effort in developing the bloc into the epicenter of growth in the Asia-Pacific region. But amid the changing global landscape, beyond the impressively comprehensive and aspirational intent lie more challenges than ever before, particularly when the United States is ruthlessly weaponizing tariffs to serve geopolitical ends at the expense of free trade.

China, which is the top trading partner as well as the comprehensive strategic partner of ASEAN, is not short of tools for cooperation in its toolbox of collaborative mechanisms. With the conclusion of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area version 3.0 negotiations, the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2026-30) (hereafter referred to as "action plan") is strategically positioned as the key vehicle to make the deepening of the multidimensional cooperation deliverable. Its success relies on how well its stakeholders can translate aspirations into actionable programs underpinned by inclusivity and symbiosis.

By and large, the action plan is envisaged to dovetail with the overarching tenets of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, and China will continue to set explicit milestones for cooperation with ASEAN in the latter's renewed pursuit of an ASEAN political-security community, economic community and sociocultural community.

On the cusp of inaugurating the action plan, China-ASEAN merchandise trade remains robust, posting a year-on-year increase of 9.6 percent for the first three quarters of 2025. The bilateral trade figures approaching the trillion-US-dollar mark look set to maintain ASEAN's position as the top trading partner of China, albeit against all odds.

The headwinds, notably the tariff-induced uncertainties and hegemonic coercion, are unlikely to wane in the region before Donald Trump's presidential tenure ends in 2029.

Looking ahead, under the framework of CAFTA 3.0, leveraging China's technology prowess in digital transformation and green transition alongside its forte in addressing climate change and sustainable development well aligns with the developmental needs across ASEAN.The paradigm change will prompt the new drivers of connectivity in cross-border payments and the flow of information to the fore, while the growing significance of cybersecurity and digital regulatory excellence may characterize the new phase of China-ASEAN partnership.

When all eyes are on the stakeholders within the region to expedite the on-going negotiation on the ASEAN Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, the action plan is anticipated to explore more deliverable avenues for maritime cooperation by prioritizing marine environmental protection, enhancing information sharing in pursuit of maritime safety and security, and fostering partnership for a sustainable blue economy by developing sustainable fisheries, aquaculture, and marine biotechnology on the high seas.

Despite the present framework of the ASEAN Political Security Community, which includes the ASEAN-led dialogue mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus and the East Asia Summit for the regional stakeholders to resolve conflicts, the bloc's dire need for a pure regional security mechanism cannot be glossed over. But this security concern is not synonymous with the fostering of security pacts with external powers or the deployment of foreign troops and military assets in the region as defined conventionally.

Over the years, challenging exigencies, ranging from poverty, food, energy and climate-induced insecurities, to cross-border terrorism and crime, alongside public health crisis response, have been mounting and taking their toll on the vulnerable economies across ASEAN. Yet, constraints of wherewithal and technology capacity remain the key hurdles to be addressed.

To this end, China's technology prowess and alternative source of multilateral development finance stand out as assets to be leveraged. Alongside the precision-focused technology cooperation that China can offer, the Chinese-initiated multilateral development bank, namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, presents viable alternatives for addressing the development finance gap.

Amid the evolving global dynamics, the conclusion of CAFTA 3.0, with significance attached to the digital economy, green transformation and electronic commerce, is set to usher in a new window of opportunity for harmonizing digital standards and facilitating cross-border data flows with enhanced cybersecurity. This serves as a timely enabler to better equip ASEAN's digital micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to access the vast Chinese market.

Parallel to this, green investment looks set to dominate the scene when more Southeast Asian mines of critical minerals are making a match with China's forte in green technology and capital. The change could be transformational as Southeast Asia evolves from a potential consumer market for green products into a strategic production hub for green technology outside China. This may reshape the potential of bolstering investment surrounding the ASEAN Economic Community pillar.

To strengthen people-to-people connectivity, the scope should go beyond tapping the vast potential of the tourism market alone. While civilizational engagement may sound abstract, livelihood-related vocational upskilling across ASEAN is a tangible form of "people empowerment" that can endear China to the public of recipient countries. Each and every instance of such "empowerment" goes far beyond a mere statistical count as it is instrumental in bettering the life trajectory of a family.

By and large, China walks the talk in reaffirming its commitment to building a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable and resilient shared future with ASEAN, rising above a mere diplomatic deed of creating a sphere of geopolitical influence.

The author is the president of the Belt and Road Initiative Caucus for Asia Pacific. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.